Friday, July 15, 2011 - 6:09 PM

THE CABLES
AFRICA
U.S. Embassy officials cautioned the Kenyan government to restrain itself in the violence following the country's 2007 election.
AMERICAS
The U.S. State Department's energy envoy urged Canada in 2009 to improve its "messaging" on a proposed oil-sands pipeline to the United States, including promoting "more positive news stories."
U.S. officials accused the leader of a pro-Cuban government peace group of threatening to pull U.S. medical students' scholarships if they met with the U.S. mission on the island in 2007.
ASIA
The Malaysian government's crackdown on bloggers in 2007.
THE NEWS
Julian Assange's extradition appeal decision is deferred. After his hearing -- complete with another round of more-than-you-wanted-to-know details about Assange's sex life -- Swedish prosecutors blast the Assange legal team's "19th Century" view of sexual consent.
Assange also found time to throw a big 40th birthday bash, inviting Angelina Jolie, Brad Pitt, and Oprah. (They didn't go.)
Wired releases the long-sought-after Adrian Lamo-Bradley Manning chat logs. Commentary from Salon's Glenn Greenwald, who had crusaded for their release, here.
U.N. torture investigator Juan Mendez says the U.S. government is violating U.N. rules in refusing him access to Manning.
Anonymous hacks military contractor Booz Allen Hamilton. (And here's a helpful family tree of the hackers who've risen to prominence since the WikiLeaks saga began.)
Blocking WikiLeaks donations prompts a competition complaint against MasterCard and Visa in Europe.
Peter Macdiarmid/Getty Images
Friday, February 4, 2011 - 2:08 PM
The U.S. government has justifiably taken a lot of heat for its relative silence regarding -- and occasional complicity in -- the human rights abuses committed by Hosni Mubarak's regime in Egypt. But it's worth highlighting an exception in a recently WikiLeaked November 2008 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Cairo, signed by Amb. Margaret Scobey, in which American diplomats did the right thing -- while Silicon Valley played it safe.
The cable concerns an Egyptian blogger whose name is redacted in the document, but who CNET thinks is most likely Wael Abbas, a celebrated dissident journalist whose efforts to distribute videos of human rights abuses by Egyptian authorities have in one case led to convictions of the perpetrators (and who, incidentally, was arrested on Friday in Cairo, though according to his Twitter feed he's since been released):
Prominent Egyptian blogger XXXXXXXXXXXXX, contacted us November 17 to report that YouTube removed from his website two videos exposing police abuses -- one of Sinai bedouin allegedly shot by police and thrown in a garbage dump during the past week's violence (ref A), and the other of a woman being tortured in a police station. XXXXXXXXXXXXX told us that YouTube is also preventing XXXXXXXXXXXX from posting new videos, and asked us for assistance in urging YouTube to re-post his removed videos and reinstate his access to uploading new material. XXXXXXXXXXXXX said XXXXXXXXXXXXXX has tried to contact Google, but has not received a response.
The cable notes that the same thing happened to the blogger the previous year -- which again suggests that the blogger in question is Abbas, who had his YouTube access restored in December 2007 after getting kicked off for posting videos of Egyptian police brutality. At the time, YouTube explained in a statement that the company's general policy banned videos depicting graphic violence, but that "Having reviewed the case, we have restored the account of Egyptian blogger Wael Abbas -- and if he chooses to upload the video again with sufficient context so that users can understand his important message we will of course leave it on the site."
While the incident was widely reported at the time, there was no mention of any involvement of the State Department in YouTube's decision. But the 2008 cable notes:
In December 2007, DRL [State's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor] and Embassy Cairo worked to convince Google [which owns YouTube] to restore XXXXXXXXXXXXX' YouTube access after a similar incident. We believe that a similar Department intervention with Google representatives could help in restoring XXXXXXXXXXXXX' access again. XXXXXXXXXXXXis an influential blogger and human rights activist, and we want to do everything we can to assist him in exposing police abuse.
A YouTube spokeswoman wouldn't confirm or deny the cable's account of the two incidents, saying in an emailed statement that "In order to protect the privacy of our users, we do not comment on actions taken on individual videos or accounts."
KHALED DESOUKI/AFP/Getty Images
Monday, January 17, 2011 - 7:37 PM
In case you missed it, Libyan strongman Muammar al-Qaddafi gave a bizarre speech this weekend lamenting the downfall of his eastern neighbor, Tunisia's Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali. The best part was when he started talking about WikiLeaks, which he calls "Kleenex":
Even you, my Tunisian brothers. You may be reading this Kleenex and empty talk on the Internet. This Internet, which any demented person, any drunk can get drunk and write in, do you believe it? The Internet is like a vacuum cleaner, it can suck anything. Any useless person; any liar; any drunkard; anyone under the influence; anyone high on drugs; can talk on the Internet, and you read what he writes and you believe it. This is talk which is for free. Shall we become the victims of “Facebook” and “Kleenex”* and “YouTube”! Shall we become victims to tools they created so that they can laugh at our moods?
Thanks to Amira Al Husseini for the translation. You can watch part of the speech here, though unfortunately it's not the same section. Toward the end here, he cites a World Economic Forum ("Day-vos," he says) report ranking Tunisia's economy among the most competitive in Africa:
Wednesday, January 12, 2011 - 3:23 PM
Britain's New Statesman has an interview with Julian Assange in its new issue out tomorrow, and the magazine is teasing a few excerpts from it today. While there's no love lost between the WikiLeaks founder and the U.S. government -- which is still trying to figure out how to extradite and charge him -- Assange says that China, not the United States, is his true "technological enemy":
China has aggressive and sophisticated interception technology that places itself between every reader inside China and every information source outside China. We've been fighting a running battle to make sure we can get information through, and there are now all sorts of ways Chinese readers can get on to our site.
Asked about his relationship with alleged document source Bradley Manning -- whose interactions or lack thereof with Assange prior to Manning's acquisition of the State Department documents is central to the question of whether the U.S. government has a case against the Australian hacker -- Assange says that "I'd never heard his name before it was published in the press," adding that "WikiLeaks technology was designed from the very beginning to make sure that we never knew the identities or names of the people submitting material."
Assange also claims to have State Department documents concerning the parent company of his media bête noire Fox News, telling the New Statesman's John Pilger that "There are 504 US embassy cables on one broadcasting organisation and there are cables on [Rupert] Murdoch and News Corp."
LIU JIN/AFP/Getty Images
Friday, December 31, 2010 - 12:54 PM
THE CABLES
AFRICA
The last days of a Guinean strongman and his allegedly drug-trafficking son -- and a curious cocaine bust bait-and-switch.
Another day, another cable about alleged central-African multi-million-dollar embezzlement -- this time in Gabon.
AMERICAS
The Obama administration dispatches a Florida senator to urge Spanish judge Baltasar Garzon not to pursue a torture case against Bush administration officials.
The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency quietly evolves into an international intelligence agency.
How a Brazilian who once kidnapped a U.S. ambassador managed to get into the United States.
McDonald's tries to muck up a free trade agreement in El Salvador.
The Jamaican government warned U.S. officials that extraditing a local drug lord would lead to trouble.
ASIA/PACIFIC
Britain trains a "government death squad" in Bangladesh.
Did Britain try to cheat Mauritius out of an island chain?
EUROPE/CAUCASUS
Inside Russia's awful prisons.
Shell thinks that Ireland could become a booming offshore gas supplier -- or not.
MIDDLE EAST
More U.S. complaints about Egypt's lackluster military.
Behind the scenes of an assassination in Dubai.
THE NEWS
Julian Assange claims (dubiously) to have the names of CIA moles in Arab governments.
Assange signs a memoir deal worth an estimated $1.7 million -- but his estranged former spokesman Daniel Domscheit-Berg (who spoke at a hacker conference this week) will be on bookshelves first.
The FBI pays back "Operation Payback" over PayPal attack.
The Cuban government is translating and publishing the Cuba-related WikiLeaked cables -- will it translate all of them?
77 percent of Americans disapprove of WikiLeaks' cable release.
Did WikiLeaks dash Zimbabwe's hopes for democracy?
Hackers claim to have brought down Zimbabwean government websites in retaliation for a WikiLeaks-related lawsuit against a Harare newspaper.
Assange falls out with his longtime confidants at the Guardian. Bianca Jagger is somehow involved.
THE BIG PICTURE
Daniel Ellsberg lawyer Floyd Abrams says Assange is no Daniel Ellsberg.
Salon's Glenn Greenwald goes to war with Wired over chat logs from Assange source Bradley Manning. (More here, here, here, here, here, here, here, and basically everywhere else on the Internet.)
HaikuLeaks adds to the proliferating genre of WikiLeaks-related verse. (English poetry buffs: this domain is still available.)
Carl Court/AFP/Getty Images
EXPLORE:AFRICA, CAUCASUS, EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA, MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AMERICA, PACIFIC, SOUTH AMERICA, SOUTH ASIA, BORDERS, DEMOCRACY, DIPLOMACY, DRUGS & CRIME, EGYPT, ELECTIONS, ENERGY, FREEDOM, HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNET, JUSTICE, LAW, MILITARY, OBAMA ADMINISTRATION, POLITICS, RUSSIA, SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY, SECURITY, STATE DEPARTMENT, TERRORISM, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, WIKILEAKS
Thursday, December 16, 2010 - 6:39 PM
Sweden's Pirate party has been a key supporter of WikiLeaks throughout its recent travails. In August, the party, which is dedicated to the repeal of copyright laws and electronic privacy, agreed to host WikiLeaks on its servers. This month, the party's Swiss branch registered WikiLeaks' new URL after it lost its .org address.
But the Pirate Party is also the subject of some of the cables. One, from shortly after Sweden's 2009 EU elections, comes with the attention-grabbing subject line, "Aargh! Swedish Pirates Set Sail for Brussels":
The big winner was the Pirate Party -- which campaigned on reformation of copyright and patent law and opposition to a wiretapping law proposed by the Swedish security services. The Pirates secured a whopping 7.1% and one seat in Parliament. The party, founded in January 2006, attracted young voters angry over the guilty verdict in the Pirate Bay trial, the unpopular EU Ipred directive, and new national laws criminalizing file sharing and authorizing monitoring of emails. The party has not yet announced what EP party group it would like to belong to, and the current thinking espoused by Pirates is that the classic political right-left scale is outdated. Rather, the Pirates see themselves as an historic movement analogous to working-class and the green movements. The party is now looking to negotiate with both the liberal ALDE group and the Greens/EFA group.
4. A side effect of the Pirates' success is that it most likely reduced the chances for the far-right nationalist Sweden Democrats to gain representation in the EP. The Pirates have some of the same voter base -- young men with mistrust for politicians. Although the Sweden Democrats tripled their results to 3.3%, up from 1.1% in 2004, they remain below the threshold for representation in either the EP or Swedish Parliament. In any case, the Pirate's landslide among younger voters caught the attention of the larger parties, our contacts tell us, who are now scrambling to come up with policies to woo the youth back to the mainstream.
Not sure I quite buy that the Pirates and the Sweden Democrats share a political base. "Young men with mistrust for politicians" is a pretty broad category. In another cable, Sweden's deputy prime minister also cites the Pirate Party's success as proof that young voters "do not trust us."
I'm hardly an expert on Swedish political movements, but I find it a little odd that the emphasis here seems to be on young Swedes' distrust for the political establishment, rather than support for the Pirate Party's stated goal of reforming copyright laws and legalizing filesharing. Sounds like a winning formula for getting out the youth vote to me.
Tuesday, December 14, 2010 - 5:38 PM
Yesterday, the Internets were abuzz with the discovery of Julian Assange's OkCupid profile, under the alias HarryHarrison. Now, it seems HarryHarrison also had a profile set up (members only) on CouchSurfing.org, a site that helps travelers find hosts to stay with when traveling.
The picture is certainly Assange and the profile does feel real. His last login was December 17th, 2006 from Budapest and his occupation is listed as "Investigative journalist / rabble rouser." In case you're wondering about his taste in movie/books/music, he likes "Obscure works produced under difficult circumstances by courageous authors". The people he enjoys include, "Voltaire. Richard Feynman. My parents."
Anyone who hosts him can look forward to "Many stories from attempted assassinations in Africa to telephone taps in Australia, to under cover in Egypt, election rigging, deportations, Russian mafia, scientific expeditions, politician's wives..."
The reviews from other users who have hosted "HarryHarrison" or stayed at his place in Melbourne are overwhelmingly positive.
Tuesday, December 14, 2010 - 9:55 AM
After I found one of my earlier FP blog posts quoted in an Anonymous press-release, I thought that I need to clarify my position. Here is my piece for Slate where I attempt to do just that. (Warning: some light political philosophy ahead).
The crux of my argument is that there are certain conditions, which, if met, could make DDoS attacks a form of civil disobedience. However, the case of Anonymous doesn't meet all of them, mostly because the Anonymous attackers don't want to take legal responsibility for their actions.
The part of my original blog post quoted in the press-release -- the one that mentioned DDoS as a "legitimate expression of dissent" -- is not at all ambiguous: what I was suggesting is that the actions of Anonymous would not be interpreted as such by the U.S. media/political circles and may thus result in more control over the Internet by the governments and complete de-legitimization of DDoS attacks as civil disobedience. So I was surprised that Anonymous took those words somewhat out of context and used them to imply that I actually viewed their acts as "legitimate"; I did not. This, however, does not mean that I view all DDoS attacks as illegitimate!
So let me just repeat this once again:
1. To understand whether DDoS attacks can be viewed as civil disobedience, we need to examine the context in which they occur.
2. As far as I can judge the context of the Anonymous case, they failed the test (for more on the specifics of the test, see my Slate piece; I rely on John Rawls's views on civil disobedience n his A Theory of Justice).
3. Operation Payback and its successors may, indeed, harm the causes of Internet freedom but this is NOT what makes them illegitimate.
There is a vibrant debate about DDoS as a legitimate expression of dissent in the blogosphere -- see this excellent summary of positions at TechPresident and this blog post by Deanna Zandt. There is an interesting comment by Ethan Zuckerman in response to Deanna's original blog post that I would like to examine a big more closely.
In short, Ethan is arguing that DDoS attacks are increasingly used to silence down independent publishers; they don't have the same resources as MasterCard or PayPal to deal with them; as a result, for them DDoS causes real rather than just temporary damage; Operation Payback has given DDoS as-a-silencing-tactic a lot of PR; and, finally -- and I am really putting words into Ethan's mouth here -- Anonymous and others should consider the consequences of their actions for others.
As much as I would like to agree with Ethan, I am not sure I am buying the (rather implicit) prescriptive part of his argument. First, it seems to conflate the issues of legitimacy and efficacy -- something that I explicitly caution against in my Slate piece. I'm strongly opposed to making efficacy a factor in evaluating the morality of particular DDoS attacks, not least because efficacy is too fickle of a concept and tends to undervalue the deterrence value of civil disobedience.
How do we know that the reason why Facebook and Twitter still have not removed WikiLeaks' account was not because they feared DDoS retaliation from Anonymous? Of course, it's much easier to measure the costs -- greater crackdown on the Internet, more NSA types in 4chan chatrooms, etc -- but it's not so easy to measure the benefits; will PayPal be as forceful in freezing the funds when it comes to the next WikiLeaks? We simply don't know -- but I'd venture to suggest that the attacks have probably had some impact on corporate decision-making.
This is not to suggest that we shouldn't try to assess the efficacy of DDoS but only to suggest that tying it to legitimacy seems misguided. That an entity like Anonymous has a good moral reason to act on something does not mean that they should necessarily act on it. In the end, it all boils down to good judgment -- and this is where wise Internet intellectuals should step in and theorize about potential fall-outs, crackdowns and what not, so that any of us can make the right (for us) call on whether to join the DDoS effort.
The other thing that bothers me about Ethan's comment is that it doesn't really make an effort to reconcile my right to protest injustice by engaging in acts of civil disobedience (forget Anonymous, we are talking abstract DDoS which doesn't fail the test) with some independent web-site's right to publish what they want and when they want online. (Remember: the theory at play here is that as DDoS get popular/mainstream, this would result in more attacks across the board, thus having a very negative impact on independent/poor publishers).
Is it really always the case that I shouldn't engage in DDoS to right some moral wrongs just because this may potentially make it harder for some third-party to conduct their affairs? I can think of conditions when this would be the case -- but critics of DDoS as civil disobedience need to spell out those conditions in great detail before they assume a particular resolution of competing claims. I can, for example, also think of conditions where my right to protest an injustice might trump a third-party's right to publish.
Otherwise, we end up with very simplistic moral and ethical frameworks where all attacks are presumed to be good or bad simply because of the intrinsic qualities of DDoS. This is an outlook that I reject as technology-centrism (in The Net Delusion, I am actually very critical of a similar tendency in "Internet freedom studies," where the assumptions about the Internet's inner logic seem to outweigh the assumptions about the context in which it manifests itself).
Unfortunately, I can't sign up to Ethan's call -- "Just don't give moral and ethical air cover to the bastards who are using DDoS to silence sites for whom a DDoS is a shut down, not a sit in" because "giving moral and ethical cover to bastards" is often the unfortunate result of allowing those who are NOT bastards to act in morally justifiable ways (as opposed to ways recommended by the estimable Berkman Center).
Until we hear some cogent arguments as to why the possibility of digital shutdowns should always prevent us from participating digital sit-ins, I would like to urge more caution on this subject. My own guess these arguments would never work in the abstract and would still need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis in the particular contexts they are set in. Which, to return to my original post, was my whole point: we shouldn't prejudge DDoS to be "good" or "bad" simply because it's illegal or because it is "DDoS."
p.s. plenty of folks -- check comments to Deanna Zandt's post -- suggest that there are better, more constructive ways to express one's solidarity with WikiLeaks or one's indignation with the companies that dumped it. Sure, there are. However, most of the "constructive" activities mentioned in the comments are fully legal and thus do not meet the definition of "civil disobedience," which presumes a breach of law. So, once again, this is the question of efficacy, not legitimacy.
Thursday, December 9, 2010 - 4:32 PM

While the demonization of Julian Assange continues apace, the following thought occurred to me (it probably occurred to you already). Suppose a reporter like David Sanger or Helene Cooper of the New York Times had been given a confidential diplomatic cable by a disgruntled government employee (or "unnamed senior official"). Suppose it was one of the juicier cables recently released by Wikileaks. Suppose further that Sanger or Cooper had written a story based on that leaked information, and then put the text of the cable up on the Times website so that readers could see for themselves that the story was based on accurate information. Would anyone be condemning them? I doubt it. Whoever actually leaked the cable might be prosecuted or condemned, but the journalists who published the material would probably be praised, and their colleagues would just be jealous that somebody else got a juicy scoop.
So if one leaked cable is just normal media fodder, how about two or three? What about a dozen? What's the magic number of leaks that turns someone from an enterprising journalist into the Greatest Threat to our foreign policy since Daniel Ellsberg? In fact, hardly anyone seems to be criticizing the Times or Guardian for having a field day with the materials that Wikileaks provided to them (which is still just a small fraction of the total it says it has), and nobody seems to hounding the editors of these publications or scouring the penal code to find some way to prosecute them.
I don't know if the sex crime charges against Assange in Sweden have any merit, and I have no idea what sort of person he really is (see Robert Wright here for a thoughtful reflection on the latter issue). I also find it interesting that the overwrought U.S. reaction to the whole business seems to be reinforcing various anti-American stereotypes. But the more I think about it, the less obvious it is to me why the man is being pilloried for doing wholesale what establishment journalists do on a retail basis all the time.
Peter Macdiarmid/Getty Images
EXPLORE:NORTH AMERICA, CELEBS, DIPLOMACY, INTELLIGENCE, INTERNET, MEDIA, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, WIKILEAKS
Thursday, December 9, 2010 - 8:30 AM
The current chapter in the WikiLeaks saga has finally forced me to come out of my blogging semi-retirement! While I'm still trying to make sense of everything that has happened in the last ten days, here are some analytical notes on Anonymous and the challenges facing the Obama administration as it mulls an appropriate response to WikiLeaks.
The impact of the recent wave of cyber-attacks launched by Anonymous on a handful of companies that dropped WikiLeaks as their client -- Amazon, EveryDNS, MasterCard, Visa and others -- is hard to gauge. I'm certain these attacks won't make any of these firms to reconsider, strike peace with WikiLeaks, and offer them some vouchers in compensation. But could the attacks serve as a deterrent to other firms that have been considering dropping WikiLeaks?
Perhaps -- but I don't know how many such companies there are. Right now, WikiLeaks is heavily dependent on Twitter and Facebook as their primary channels for external communications; it's these two firms that need to be watched most closely. (I don't expect many people to call on Google to remove WikiLeaks from its search results -- but let's wait and see...) So far, both Twitter and Facebook have been taking rather bold steps: they declined to stop doing business with WikiLeaks and actually removed the accounts of Anonymous (alas with little success, as new accounts were created within minutes). It's clear that should these two companies succumb to pressure and part with WikiLeaks this would result in a major online backlash.
Now, the fact that Anonymous chose to go after Visa and MasterCard has created all sorts of other challenging issues. While the attacks targeted only the public web-sites of these companies -- rather than the underlying infrastructure that allows card transactions to be processed -- such subtleties are likely to get lost in the public debate. As far as policymakers are concerned, these attacks would be viewed as striking at the very of the global economy (even if they obviously aren't in reality). It's still not clear to me whether any credit card data has been leaked or compromised as a result of such attacks, even though Anonymous posted some links to such data on their Twitter feed. This too won't matter, as most people would assume that data has, in fact, been stolen.
I seriously doubt that U.S. authorities would be able to effectively go after Anonymous, in part because there are too many people involved, they are scattered all over the globe, and attributing cyber-attacks to them would be impossible (and would surely require reading a lot of chat transcripts from IRC). The only other possible policy response at their disposal is to make it easier to trace such attacks in the future -- most likely by empowering the likes of NSA/Cyber Command. I would imagine that after the current cyber-attacks on credit card companies -- even if they didn't cause much damage -- this would enjoy bipartisan support in the United States.
As far as long-term developments are concerned, I think that much depends on whether the WikiLeaks saga would continue being a debate about freedom of expression, government transparency or whistle-blowing or whether it would become a nearly-paranoid debate about the risks to national security. Anonymous is playing with fire, for they risk tipping the balance towards the latter interpretation -- and all the policy levers that come with it.
That said, I don't think that their attacks are necessarily illegal or immoral. As long as they don't break into other people's computers, launching DDoS should not be treated as a crime by default; we have to think about the particular circumstances in which such attacks are launched and their targets. I like to think of DDoS as equivalents of sit-ins: both aim at briefly disrupting a service or an institution in order to make a point. As long as we don't criminalize all sit-ins, I don't think we should aim at criminalizing all DDoS.
I can spend hours debating this subject but, in short, while Anonymous' actions may result in greater government oversight of the Internet, they are not necessarily illegal or immoral just because they involve DDoS attacks. The danger here is obviously that if the narrative suddenly becomes dominated by national security concerns, we can forget about DDoS as legitimate means of expression dissent -- that possibility would be closed, as they would be criminalized.
What is the impact of these attacks on WikiLeaks? The organization has been silent about its own relationship to Anonymous -- I didn't see any tweets, let alone press-releases, that either spoke out against or in favor of cyber-attacks. As far as strategy is concerned, I think it's a big mistake for WikiLeaks to stay silent on the issue. In the absence of any statements from their end, most people -- especially those who have never heard of Anonymous before -- would assume that they are part of the same hacker gang. (Sarah Palin seem to have implied as much when she accused WikiLeaks about attacking her site).
That WikiLeaks chose not to address this issue publicly suggests that the organization is either overstretched or has not yet reached a level of maturity that some of us expect from it before expressing our unqualified support for what they do. As long as most people link WikiLeaks to the cyber-attacks on credit card companies, it's a net loss for WikiLeaks. It would also make it easier for certain cyber-hawks in Washington to justify classifying them as a "terrorist" organization -- at least whenever they appear on Fox News. Arguably, this is not a battle they can win with facts anyway -- but they should at least be leaving some public record of their stance on such issues. I'm also not sure about the overstretching argument: I'm sure plenty of smart people would volunteer to do PR for WikiLeaks for free...
All in all, if the public continues to associate WikiLeaks with hacking and cyber-attacks -- rather than, say, providing a safe platform for whistleblowers -- this will greatly erode the goodwill that WikiLeaks has built over the course of the last few months by increasing their cooperation with media organizations and NGOs. That "normalization by third parties" allayed the concerns of many -- but cyber-attacks may once again seed doubt in many people's minds.
Looking beyond Anonymous, I'd like to note that when it comes to crafting an appropriate response to WikiLeaks, the Obama administration is in a very delicate position. On the one hand, the domestic pressure to do something about WikiLeaks is growing -- and it will get even worse, as Anonymous continues its attacks and adds more political targets to their list (and I'm sure they will as there is some vicious circle at play here: the more attacks they launch, the more people condemn WikiLeaks, the more new targets Anonymous has). On the other hand, it's obvious that going after WikiLeaks would put the final nails in the coffin of the State Department's Internet Freedom Agenda, which is the most obvious victim of the last ten days.
I have always had mixed feelings about this Internet Freedom drive. While I think it's misguided and led by highfalutin techno-boosters unaware of the geopolitical background to their own actions, it's also obvious to me that there is some good that may come out of the U.S. government's interest in such matters -- for example, the support they offered to tools like Tor has been most appreciated. (That support, however, predated the formation of the Internet Freedom Agenda as articulated by Clinton in January 2010).
The real question here is whether, as the public attitudes towards tools like Tor -- which provide the very anonymity that benefits leakers -- quickly turn negative, the State Department and agencies like the National Endowment for Democracy would lose the ability to fund anything in this space. It's also not clear to me whether many of the geeks associated with the "Internet freedom" movement would feel comfortable taking money from the U.S. government, given that the latter are actively pursuing people like Assange.
I think this partly explains why the U.S. government has been so slow/low I key in lashing out against WikiLeaks, leaving the rhetorical heavy-lifting to populists like Sarah Palin, Rush Limbaugh and Joe Lieberman. Leaving in their hands also means abandoning control of the conversation; so far, it seems to me that such approach has been quite detrimental.
For example, many foreign politicians are already calling on Washington's duplicity and lack of media freedoms and disrespect of human rights -- all because Glenn Beck and Sarah Palin said something radical. As far as most foreign audiences are concerned, few draw distinctions between the elected officials, those in the opposition, and the punditry -- they are all part of "Washington"; so whatever the radicals says would, of course, eventually be associated with the White House and the State Department. I don't know how long the administration can afford to stay on the sidelines of this debate.
Another possible unfortunate consequence of the current backlash is that more U.S. government funding would go to tools that don't provide full anonymity but that still allow to circumvent censorship in authoritarian states. These are the tools developed by the Falun Gong technologists who already enjoy vast support from various neocon interest groups in Washington.
This would be most unfortunate and would further alienate geeks from policymakers, as Falun Gong tools are less effective and, well, they don't provide much security at all. This would only further reveal the duplicitous nature of Washington's Internet Freedom Agenda: it will seem as if all they want to promote is the ability to break through China's firewall -- but not the ability to say and publish what one wants without attribution. Many people in the State Department are not very keen on the Falun Gong crowd either, so I can't imagine that they would be interested in highlighting such issues (and yes, I know that State Dept is not monolithic but getting into internal squabbling inside Foggy Bottom would add another page or two to this post!).
I hope to post more analysis soon! In the meantime, make sure to check my Twitter feed, where I do post occasional observations and share links about WikiLeaks.
Update #1: There is now a statement on Anonymous/DDoS posted on WikiLeaks' site. They distance themselves from the attack -- which is good -- but don't really say what they feel about it (which is not so good...)
Tuesday, November 30, 2010 - 10:30 AM

I am traveling a lot this week -- first to D.C. and then to Toronto -- so blogging is likely to be light through Friday. Before I head off to get poked and prodded by the friendly TSA personnel at Logan, I thought I'd leave you with a hypothetical to ponder, inspired by the latest WikiLeaks releases.
Here's the question: How much difference would it really make if all these "private" diplomatic meetings were public? Suppose there was no such thing as a "private" diplomatic meeting or a back-channel discussion. I can easily imagine that world leaders wouldn't like it very much -- but how much would world politics change if all these conversations were held in public so that people could see and hear what was being said?
I don't have a firm answer on this issue, but one possibility is that this hypothetical situation would pose a much bigger problem for authoritarian leaders than it would for democratically elected ones. If an autocrat knew that their conversations would all be public, they wouldn't be able to say one thing in private and then say something else when speaking on the record. And that means that some of them might have to adopt positions that were more in accordance with their populations wishes, particularly if their hold on power was tenuous. It would all be on the record. By contrast, a democratic leader would just have to take positions that they felt would appeal to their electorate, which isn't such a terrible idea on its face.
Of course, there's a downside here: you'd get a lot more posturing, and maybe even diplomatic rigidity, as leaders of all kinds tried to show that they were tough bargainers. And public opinion is a fickle thing, and you wouldn't want leaders to be nothing more than weather vanes mouthing whatever their latest poll told them to say. It's also likely that some diplomatic conversations would be empty and stilted, because nobody wanted to talk about anything serious in the full glare of open disclosure. But diplomatic problems still need to get solved, and a world of full disclosure might actually force leaders of all types to explain the realities behind their decisions a bit more, and educate the population when public opinion was off-base.
But my real question remains: Would it really make that much difference? Would a world of "open covenants, openly arrived at" (to use Wilson's phrase) really be that different than the world in which we live today? And aren't all those people who are now defending the importance of diplomatic confidentiality really saying that there is a lot of information that our leaders have to keep from us, or else the world will all go to hell?
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Monday, November 29, 2010 - 12:17 PM

As with earlier WikiLeaks "revelations," the latest batch of classified communications is bound to be something of a Rorschach test. With a wealth of cables from which to choose, readers will be inclined to see in them what they want to see. I've been reading some of the latest releases and I've read the New York Times accounts pretty carefully, but thus far, I haven't seen anything that fundamentally alters my views about U.S. foreign policy. Nor have I seen any other commentator who says that they've changed their mind about some important contemporary issue either. That said, here are a few tentative reactions.
First, everyone should remember that these documents are not revealed truth or literal transcripts of an event. Like most forms of diplomatic reportage, they are a version of events or a summary of impressions, as seen through the eyes of the person (in most cases mid-level officials) who are drafting the message. Even when one is just summarizing a meeting, whoever is drafting the cable gets to emphasize certain things and to omit or downplay others, and that includes the possibility that they misheard, misinterpreted, or misunderstood what was said. Context matters too: what foreign officials say will be shaped by what they are trying to accomplish and also what they think their American interlocutors want or need to hear, and it's hard to identify the full context from these releases alone.
Please note that I am not arguing that there isn't useful information here. My point is that we bear in mind that these cables are the products of individual human drafters who have their own agendas and frailties, and that the discussions they are summarizing do not occur in isolation. And although these documents clearly tell us something about a number of key policies, they are a very incomplete picture.
Second, as with previous WikiLeaks releases, we need to be very wary about our initial conclusions. Only a small number of cables have been released so far, and the media outlets that were given access to them (the New York Times, the Guardian, and Der Spiegel) are picking and choosing from among the one's they've seen. Until we've had a chance to see the full set of releases, a degree of interpretive caution is in order.
Third, I am less troubled than some others about the possibility that these documents will expose gaps between what governments say they are doing and what they are actually doing. Some commentators worry, for example, that these documents have exposed the hypocrisy of the Yemeni government, which has been pretending that it wasn't allowing the United States to conduct drone strikes on its territory. Others probably fear that some particularly pungent comments about various world leaders might get exposed, and thereby creating undesirable frictions. There's also the concern that foreign representatives will be less candid in the future, for fear of being exposed by some subsequent leak.
But let's get serious for a second. I doubt there are any major world leaders who once believed that we held them in the highest regard, and who will now be crushed to learn that some of our officials had reservations about them. (I'm willing to bet that plenty of foreign cables say less-than-flattering things about U.S. officials too, and that those officials wouldn't be entirely shocked were those reports to go public). I give most leaders a bit more credit than that: most people know when there are significant differences between allies and even personal points of friction, even if they are papered over with appropriate diplomatic niceties. It's mildly embarrassing to have this out in public, but I'm not sure anybody is going to feel seriously betrayed or misled.
And as for the possibility that American diplomats will be exposed as less than 100 percent honest: at this stage in our history, is all that even remotely surprising? I mean, after the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, Iran/Contra, the cruise missile attack on Sudan, Colin Powell's cooked-up testimony to the Security Council in 2002, how many people are under that many illusions about the dark underbelly of U.S. foreign policy? And it's hardly headline news to learn that the United States has been obsessed with Iran's nuclear program, reflexively solicitous of Israel's concerns, worried about North Korea, or deeply concerned about al Qaeda. Some of the details in these cables are interesting, but none of the dispatches I've read or the news accounts I've seen suggest that a major rewriting of recent diplomacy is in order.
Fourth, the recurring theme that I keep seeing in these documents -- it's my own Rorschach, I guess -- is how everybody around the world wants Uncle Sucker to solve their problems. South Korea and the U.S. talk about what to do if North Korea collapses. Israeli officials keep demanding that we deal with Iran and preserve their "qualitative military edge." Some Arab leaders in the Persian Gulf want us to stop an Iranian bomb too, but they don't agree on the steps we should take to achieve that aim. And so on.
You'd expect these documents to contain a lot of this sort of special pleading, of course, because they are reports from American officials who have been meeting with various foreign counterparts and trying to figure out what they think or want. Nonetheless, it is still striking how many pies the United States has its fingers in, and how others keep expecting us to supply the ingredients, do most of the baking, and clean up the kitchen afterwards.
Fifth, the big story in the early releases -- at least as highlighted in the Times -- seems to be the combination of the clear U.S. obsession with Iran and the fact that some Arab leaders expressed great concern about the prospect of an Iranian bomb. It was as predictable as the sun rising tomorrow that hard-line advocates of doing whatever it takes to stop an Iranian bomb would immediately seize upon the initial releases to buttress their case, but the documents don't actually support that conclusion. As Andrew Sullivan points out, the same people who routinely dismiss Arab calls for a different U.S. policy on the Israel-Palestinian peace process are now suddenly convinced that these same Arab leaders are pillars of wisdom. In any case, it is hardly a revelation to learn that some Gulf rulers would a) prefer a non-nuclear Iran, and b) would prefer it if the United States did the heavy lifting and bore the onus of taking care of this problem. It would be astonishing if they thought any other way.
But the crucial question all along has been how to address that issue, and here these releases show some ambivalence. There is hardly a consistent chorus of voices telling the United States to go ahead and bomb the place. Some leaders seem inclined in that way; others much less so. I've heard other senior Arab and Muslim officials say that it would be a calamity if we did.
Lastly, the big question I keep pondering is this: would it be all that bad if diplomats understood that secret deals and two-faced diplomacy wasn't going to be that easy anymore, because the true facts might leak out sooner rather than in twenty or thirty years time? I can think of a few cases where secrecy has been useful (Kennedy's deal over the Jupiter missiles in Turkey during the Cuban Missile Crisis comes to mind), but in general I think human beings -- and this include foreign policy-makers -- are more inclined to do bad things when they think they can do so without being exposed. If you have to keep something secret, that's often a sign that you shouldn't be doing it at all.
And at the risk of seeming like a naïve Wilsonian (the cruelest thing you can call a realist like me!), the whole episode raises the larger issue of whether the citizens of a republic have the right to know exactly what representatives are doing and saying in their name, backed up by the money and military power that the citizens have paid for with their taxes. And I don't mean finding out thirty years later, but now. I'm sure that most diplomats would prefer to minimize democratic scrutiny of their activities, as it would surely be annoying if Congress or the media or (God forbid!) ordinary citizens were to peer over their shoulders while they are trying to line up foreign support. But given that I am less and less convinced that our elites know what they are doing, I'm also less inclined to want to let them operate outside public view.
But there is a real downside, which is why I retain some concerns about this latest batch of revelations. If diplomats start fearing that any conversation or cable might get leaked, they will either stop talking, stop taking notes, or stop sending message back to headquarters in any sort of republishable form. There's an old line from Chicago city politics: "Don't write if you can talk; don't talk if you can nod; don't nod if you can wink." Somehow, I'm not sure our diplomacy will be enhanced if our representatives are reduced to making facial gestures, and communicating back home only through secure telephones.
FABRICE COFFRINI/AFP/Getty Images
WikiLeaked is FP’s blog dedicated to sorting through and making sense of the more than 250,000 State Department cables acquired by WikiLeaks.
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